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Extensions of the Kochen-Specker theorem use quantum logics whose classical interpretation suggests a true-
implies-value indefiniteness property. This can be interpreted as an indication that any view of a quantum state
beyond a single context is epistemic.
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I. QUANTUM CONTEXTS AS VIEWS ON STATES
Contexts arise naturally in quantum mechanics: they cor-
respond to greatest classical subdomains within the expanse
of conceivable quantum propositions. For all empirical mat-
ters, every observable within a particular fixed context can
be assumed classical with respect and relative to that context.
Therefore, according to Gleason [1], it appears prudent to as-
sume that classical probabilities should be applicable to such
classical mini-universes; and, in particular, when considering
observables within a given context. Gleason formalized this
in terms of frame functions and proceeded to show how the
quantum probabilities – in particular, the Born rule – can be
“stitched together” from these classical bits and pieces. This
paper can be seen as a prolegomenon to this approach; and as
a contribution to the ongoing search for its semantics.
Formally, the concept of context can be exposed in two
ways: one is in terms of “largest possible” sets of orthogonal
pure states; that is, in terms of (unit) vectors and their linear
spans. Another one is by maximal operators and the perpen-
dicular projection operators in their non-degenerate spectral
decomposition.
Let us start by supposing that contexts can be represented
by orthonormal bases of Hilbert space. Due to the spectral the-
orem this immediately gives rise to an equivalent conception
of context: that as a maximal observable which is formed by
some (non-degenerate) spectral sum of the mutually orthog-
onal perpendicular projection operators corresponding to the
basis states. This is just the expression of the dual role of per-
pendicular projection operators in quantum mechanics: they
represent both pure states as well as observable bits; that is,
elementary yes-no propositions.
For the sake of an elementary example, suppose one is
dealing with (lossless) electron spin state (or photon polar-
ization) measurements. As there are two outcomes, the asso-
ciated Hilbert space is two-dimensional. The two outcomes
can be identified with two arbitrary orthogonal normalized
vectors therein, forming an orthonormal basis. Suppose, for
the sake of further simplicity, that we parametrize this basis
to be the standard Cartesian basis in two-dimensional Hilbert
space, its two vectors being [2, Eq. (1.8)] |0〉 = (1,0)⊺ and
|1〉 = (0,1)⊺, where the superscript symbol “⊺” indicates
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transposition. Their dyadic products E0 = |0〉〈0| =
(
1,0
)⊺⊗(
1,0
)
=
(
1 0
0 0
)
,E1 =
(
0 0
0 1
)
form the corresponding (mu-
tually) orthogonal perpendicular projection operators. These
contexts can be either represented in terms of vectors, like
C = {|0〉, |1〉}, or in terms of perpendicular projection opera-
tors, like C = {E0,E1}.
Any two distinct numbers λ0 6= λ1 define a maximal opera-
tor through the “weighted” spectral sum
A= λ0E0+λ1E1 = λ0|0〉〈0|+λ1|1〉〈1|=
(
λ0 0
0 λ1
)
. (1)
The term “maximal” refers to the fact that A “spans” a “clas-
sical sub-universe” of mutually commuting operators through
variations of f (A) = f (λ0)E0 + f (λ1)E1, where f : R 7→ R
represents some real valued polynomial or function of a single
real argument [3, § 84, Theorems 1&2,p 171]. In particular,
this includes the context C = {E0,E1} through the two binary
functions fi(λ j) = δi j, with i, j ∈ {0,1}.
II. PROBABILITIES ON CONTEXTS IN QUANTUM
MECHANICS
Let us concentrate on probabilities next. As already men-
tioned, Gleason [1] observed that classical observables should
obey classical probabilities – this should be the same for
Bayesian and frequentist approaches. Can we, therefore, hope
for the existence of some “Realding” – that is, some global
ontology, some enlarged panorama of “real physical proper-
ties” – behind these stitched probabilities? As it turns out,
relative to reasonable assumptions and the absence of exotic
options, this is futile.
Formally this issue can be rephrased by recalling that the
main formal entities of quantum mechanics are all based on
Hilbert space; that is, on vectors, as well as their relative po-
sition and permutations. A pure state represented as a vec-
tor |ψ〉 can be conveniently parameterized or encoded by co-
ordinates referring to the respective bases. Because of their
convenience one chooses orthonormal bases – that is, con-
texts – for such a parametrization. Why is convenience im-
portant? Because, as has been noted earlier, in finite dimen-
sions D any such context C ≡ {|e1〉, |e2〉, . . . , |eD〉} can also
be interpreted as a maximal set of co-measurable propositions
C ≡ {E1,E2, . . . ,ED} with Ei = |ei〉〈ei|, 1 ≤ i ≤ D, as the
2latter refers to a complete system of orthogonal perpendicu-
lar projections which are a resolution of the identity opera-
tor ID = ∑
D
i=1Ei. For any such context, classical Kolmogorov
probability theory requires the probabilities P to satisfy the
following axioms:
A1 – probabilities are real-valued and non-negative:
P(Ei) ∈ R, and P(Ei) ≥ 0 for all Ei ∈ C , or, equiva-
lently, 1≤ i≤ D;
A2 – probabilities of mutually exclusive observables within
contexts are additive: P
(
∑
k≤D
i=1 Ei
)
= ∑
k≤D
i=1 P(Ei) ;
A3 – probabilities within one context add up to one:
P(ID) = P
(
∑Di=1Ei
)
= 1.
How can probabilities Pψ (E) of propositions formalized
by perpendicular projection operators (or, more generally, ob-
servables whose spectral sums contain such propositions) on
given states |ψ〉 be formed which adhere to these axioms?
As already Gleason pointed out in the second paragraph of
Ref. [1, Sect. 1, p. 885], there is an ad hoc way to obtain a
probability measure on Hilbert spaces: a vector |ψ〉 can be
“viewed” through a “probing context” C as follows:
(i) For each closed subspace spanned by the vectors |ei〉
in the context C , take the projection Ei|ψ〉 of |ψ〉 onto
|ei〉.
(ii) Take the absolute square of the length (norm) of this
projection and identify it with the probability Pψ (Ei)
of finding the quantum system which is in state |ψ〉 to
be in state |ei〉; that is (the symbol “†” stands for the
Hermitian adjoint):
Pψ (Ei) = (Ei|ψ〉)†Ei|ψ〉= 〈ψ |E†i Ei|ψ〉
= 〈ψ |ei〉〈ei|ei〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
〈ei|ψ〉= 〈ψ |ei〉〈ei|ψ〉= ‖〈ei|ψ〉‖2. (2)
Because of the mutual orthogonality of the elements in the
context C , the Pythagorean theorem enforces the third axiom
A3 as long all vectors involved are normalized; that is, has
length (norm) 1. This situation is depicted in Fig. 1.
The situation is symmetric in a sense which reflects the du-
ality between observable and state observed: Suppose now
that the state |ψ〉 is “completed” by other vectors to form an
entire context C ′. Then one could consider this context C ′,
including |ψ〉 to “probe” vectors – now identified as states –
in the original context C . Very similarly, probability mea-
sures adhering axioms A1–A3 can be constructed by, say, for
instance, PEψ (Ei)
It is important to keep in mind that, although Gleason’s
Ansatz is about a single context C it is valid for all con-
texts; indeed, formally, for a continuum of contexts repre-
sented by the continuum of possible orthonormal bases of D-
dimensional Hilbert space. Every such context entails a par-
ticular view on the state |ψ〉; and there are a continuum of such
views on the state |ψ〉.
Furthermore, there is a symmetry between the two contexts
C and C ′ involved. We may call C ′ the “preparation context”
|e2〉
|e1〉
r = 1
|ψ〉
E1|ψ〉
E2|ψ〉
|ϕ〉
E1|ϕ〉
E2|ϕ〉
Eψ |e1〉
Eϕ |e1〉
Eψ |e2〉
Eϕ |e2〉
FIG. 1. An orthonormal basis forming a context C = {|e1〉, |e2〉}
represents a frame of reference from which a “view” on a state |ψ〉
can be obtained. Formally, if the vectors |ψ〉 and |ϕ〉 are normal-
ized, such that 〈ψ|ψ〉 = 〈ϕ|ϕ〉 = 1, then the absolute square of the
length (norm) of the projections E1|ψ〉 = |e1〉〈e1|ψ〉 and E2|ψ〉 =
|e2〉〈e2|ψ〉 as well as E1|ϕ〉 = |e1〉〈e1|ϕ〉 and E2|ϕ〉 = |e2〉〈e2|ϕ〉
add up to one. Conversely, a second context C ′ = {|ψ〉, |ϕ〉} grants
a frame of reference from which a “view” on the first context C can
be obtained.
and C the “measurement context,” but these denominations
are purely conventional. In this sense, it is a matter of conven-
tion if we consider “C probing C ′” or “C ′ probing C .”
There is one “privileged view” on the preparation context
C ′: that is the view obtained if both the preparation and mea-
surement contexts coincide: C = C ′. Under such circum-
stances the observables are value definite: their values coin-
cide with those of the preparation.
III. CONTEXTS IN PARTITION LOGICS AND THEIR
PROBABILITIES
This section is a reminder rather than an exposition [4–10]
into partition logics. Suffice it to say that partition logics are
probably the most elementary generalization of Boolean alge-
bras: they are the Boolean subalgebras associated with sets of
partitions of a given set which are “pasted” or “stitched” to-
gether at their common elements; similar to contexts (blocks,
subalgebras) in quantum logic. The main difference is that
the latter is a continuous logic based on geometrical entities
(vectors), whereas partition logics are discrete, finite algebraic
structures based on sets of partitions of a given set. Never-
theless, for empirical purposes, it is always possible to come
up with a partition logic mimicking the respective quantum
logic [11]. Partition logics have two knownmodel realization:
automaton logics [12–14] and generalized urn models [15–
17].
3Just like classical probabilities on Boolean logics the prob-
abilities on Boolean structures are formed by a convex sum-
mation of all two-valued measures [9, 10, 18] – correspond-
ing to ball types. Such probabilities will hencefort called
(quasi)classical.
IV. PROBABILITIES ON PASTINGS OR STITCHINGS OF
CONTEXTS
From dimension D ≥ 3 onwards, contexts can be non-
trivially connected or intertwined [1] in up to D− 2 com-
mon elements. Such intertwining chains of contexts give
rise to various apparently “non-classical” logics; and a wealth
(some might say a plethora) of publications dealing with ever-
increasing “strange” or “magic” properties of observables
hitherto unheard of in classical physics. The following logics
have a realization in (mostly three-dimensional if not stated
otherwise) Hilbert space. For concrete parametrizations, the
reader is either referred to the literature, or to a recent sur-
vey [10, Chapter 12].
On such pastings of contexts, (quasi)classical probabilities
and their bounds, termed conditions of possible experience by
Boole [19, p. 229], can be obtained in three steps [8–10, 18]:
(i) Enumerate all truth assignments (or two-{0,1}-valued
measures or states) vi.
(ii) The (quasi)classical probabilities are obtained by the
formation of the convex sum ∑i λivi over all such states
obtained in (i), with 0≤ λi ≤ 1 and ∑i λi = 1.
(ii) The Bell-type bounds on probabilities and expectations
are attained by bundling these truth assignments into
vectors, one per two-valued measure, with the coordi-
nates representing the respective values of those states
on the atoms (propositions, observables) of the logic;
and by subsequently solving the Hull problem for a con-
vex polytope whose vertices are identified with the vec-
tors formed by all truth assignments [20–23].
In what follows some such quantum logics will be enumer-
ated whose quantum probabilities co-exist and sometimes vio-
late their (quasi)classical probabilities, if they exist. Such vio-
lations can be expected to occur quite regularly, as – although
in both cases the probability axioms A1–A3 are satisfied for
mutually compatible observables – the quantum probabilities
are formed very differently from the (quasi)classical ones; that
is, not by convex sums as in the (quasi)classical case, but by
scalar products among vectors.
A. Triangular and square logics in four dimensions
For geometric and algebraic reasons there is no cyclic past-
ing of three or four contexts in three dimensions, but in
four dimensions this is possible; as depicted in Fig. 2. The
(quasi)classical probabilities are enumerated in the Appen-
dices A and B.
1
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FIG. 2. Informally, Greechie (or, in another wording, orthogo-
nality) diagrams [24] represent contexts by smooth curves such as
straight lines or circles. The atoms are represented by circles. Two
intertwining contexts are represented by “broken” (not smooth) but
connected lines. (a) Greechie orthogonality diagram of the triangle
logic in four dimensions, realized by (from top) 1 : 12
(
1,1,1,1
)⊺
,
2 : 1√
2
(
1,0,−1,0)⊺, 3 : 1√
2
(
0,1,0,−1)⊺, 4 : 12 (−1,1,−1,1)⊺,
5 : 1√
2
(
0,1,1,0
)⊺
, 6 : 1√
2
(
1,0,0,1
)⊺
, 7 : 12
(
1,1,−1,−1)⊺, 8 :
1√
2
(
0,0,1,−1)⊺, and 9 : 1√
2
(
1,−1,0,0)⊺. (b) Greechie orthogonal-
ity diagram of the square logic in four dimensions, realized by (from
top right) 1 :
(
1,0,0,0
)⊺
, 2 : 1√
2
(
0,1,0,1
)⊺
, 3 : 1√
2
(
0,1,0,−1)⊺,
4 :
(
0,0,1,0
)⊺
, 5 : 1√
2
(
1,1,0,0
)⊺
, 6 : 1√
2
(
1,−1,0,0)⊺, 7 :(
0,0,0,1
)⊺
, and 8 : 1√
2
(
1,0,1,0
)⊺
, 9 : 1√
2
(
1,0,−1,0)⊺, 10 :(
0,1,0,0
)⊺
, 11 : 1√
2
(
0,0,1,1
)⊺
, 12 : 1√
2
(
0,0,1,−1)⊺. The asso-
ciated (quasi)classical probabilities are obtained from a convex sum-
mation over all truth assignments, and listed in the Appendices A
and B.
Summation of the (quasi)classical probabilities on the in-
tertwining atoms of the triangle logic yields p1 + p4 + p7 =
λ1 + λ2 + λ7 + λ12 + λ13 + λ14 ≤ 1. However, the axioms
of probability theory are too restrictive to allow for quan-
tum violations of these probabilities: after all, these adjacent
vertices are mutually orthogonal, and thus are in the same
context (augmented with the fourth atom of that context).
Other inequalities, such as p1 + p2 = λ1 + λ2 ≤ p5 + p6 =
(λ1+ λ3+ λ4+ λ8+ λ9)+ (λ2+ λ5+ λ6+ λ10+ λ11), com-
pare vertices with the adjacent “inner” atoms; but again, due
to the probability axiom A3, the quantum probabilities must
obey these inequalities as well.
Komei Fukuda’s cddlib package [25] can be employed
for a calculation of the hull problem, yielding all Bell-type
inequalities associated with the convex polytope whose ver-
tices are associated with the 14 or 34 truth assignments (two-
valued measures) on the respective triangle and square logics.
It turns out that all of them are expressions of the axiomsA1–
A3 which are mandatory also for the quantum probabilities
within contexts.
B. Pentagon (pentagram) logic
The pentagon (graph theoretically equivalent to a penta-
gram) logic is a cyclic stitching or pasting of five contexts [26–
32] as depicted in Fig. 3. The (quasi)classical probabilities [9,
41
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FIG. 3. Greechie orthogonality diagram of the pentagon (pentagram)
logic. The associated (quasi)classical probabilities are obtained from
a convex summation over all truth assignments, and listed in the Ap-
pendix C.
p. 289, Fig. 11.8] can be obtained by taking the convex sum of
all the 11 two-valued measures [26], as listed in Appendix C.
Because of the convex sum of all λ ’s add up to one, the sum
of the (quasi)classical probabilities enumerated in Eq. (C1),
taken merely on the 5 intertwining observables, yields
p1+ p3+ p5+ p7+ p9
= λ1+λ4+λ7+λ9+λ10+ 2(λ2+λ3+λ5+λ6+λ8)
≤ 2
11
∑
i=1
λi = 2.
(3)
This inequality is in violation of quantum predictions [30, 32]
of
√
5 > 2. Note that, in order to obtain the probabilities on
the five intertwining observables (vertices) all of them need to
be determined. However, only adjacent pairs share a common
context. So at least three incompatible measurement types are
necessary.
C. Specker bug logic with the true–implies–false property
A pasting of two pentagon logics, the “Specker bug” logic,
has been introduced [33, Fig. 1, p. 182] and used [34, Γ1,
p. 68] by Kochen and Specker and discussed by many re-
searchers [35–37]; see also Refs. [38, Fig. B.l. p. 64], [39,
p. 588-589], [40, Sects. IV, Fig. 2] and [41, p. 39, Fig. 2.4.6].
It is a pasting [27, 42] of seven contexts in such a tight way
[cf. Fig. 4(a)] that preparation of a (quasi)classical system in
state a entails non-occurrence of observable b. As has been
observed by Stairs [39, p. 588-589] and Clifton [40, 43, 44,
Sects. II,III, Fig. 1], this is no longer the case for quantum
states and quantum observables. Therefore, if one prepares
a system in a state |a〉 and measures Eb = |b〉〈b|, associated
with state |b〉, then the mere occurrence of |b〉 implies the
non-classicality of the quantized system.
Again the (quasi)classical probabilities [9, p. 286,
Fig. 11.5(iii)] enumerated in Appendix D can be obtained by
taking the convex sum of all the 14 two-valued measures [8,
p. 579, Table 7]. Pta´k and Pulmannova´ [41, p. 39, Fig. 2.4.6]
as well as Pitowsky in Refs. [36, p. 402, Fig. 2] and [37,
pp. 224,225, Fig. 10.2] noted that, for (quasi)classical prob-
abilities – including ones on partition logics – the sum of the
probabilities on |a〉 and |b〉must not exceed 3
2
. Therefore both
cannot be true at the same time, because this would result in
their sum being 2. This might be called a true–implies–false
property [45] (aka one-zero rule [46]) on the atoms a and b.
Actually, this classical bound can be tightened by explicity
summing the (quasi)classical probabilities of a and b enumer-
ated in Eq. (D2) Because of the convex sum of all λ ’s add up
to one, this yields yields
pa+ pb = λ1+λ2+λ3+λ6+λ13+λ14 ≤
14
∑
i=1
λi = 1. (4)
This inequality is in violation of quantum predictions for a
system prepared in state |a〉; in this case [47], 10
9
> 1.
Indeed, Cabello [47] (see also his dissertation [48,
pp. 55,56]) pointed out that in three dimensions, |a〉 and |b〉
must be at least an angle ∠(a,b)≥ arcsec(3) = arccos( 1
3
)
=
pi
2
− arccot
(
2
√
2
)
= arctan
(
2
√
2
)
apart. Therefore, the
probability to find a state prepared along |a〉 ≡ (1,0,0)⊺
in a state |b〉 ≡ (cos∠(a,b),sin∠(a,b),0)⊺ cannot exceed
|〈b|a〉|2 = 1/9. Thus in at most one-ninth of all cases will
quantum mechanical probabilities violate the classical ones,
as the classical prediction demands zero probability to mea-
sure b, given a. (This prediction is relative to the assumption
of non-contextuality, such that the truth assignment is inde-
pendent of the particular context.) For a concrete “optimal”
realization [49, p. 206, Fig. 1] (see also [50, Fig. 4, p. 5387]),
take |a〉 = 1√
3
(
1,
√
2,0
)⊺
and |b〉 = 1√
3
(−1,√2,0)⊺ which
yield |〈b|a〉|= 1
3
.
Another true-implies-false configuration depicted in
Fig. 5(a) has an immediate quantum realization [51, Table. 1,
p. 102201-7] for |〈a|b〉|2 = 1
2
, and can be constructively (i.e.,
algorithmically computable) extended to arbitrary angles
between non-collinear and non-orthogonal vectors.
D. Combo of Specker bug logic with the true–implies–true as
well as inseparability properties
This non-classical behaviour can be “boosted” by an ex-
tension of the Specker bug logic [34, Γ1, p. 68], including
two additional contexts {a,c,b′} as well as {b,c,a′}, as de-
picted in Fig. 4(b). It implements a true-implies-true prop-
erty [45] (aka one-one rule [46]) for a and a′. Cabello’s
bound on the angle ∠(a,b) between a and b mentioned ear-
lier results in bounds between a and a′ as well as b and
b′: since a and b′ as well as b and a′ are orthogonal, that
is, ∠(a,b′) = ∠(b,a′) = pi
2
, it follows for planar configura-
tions that ∠(a,a′) = ∠(b,a′)−∠(a,b) ≤ pi
2
− arccos( 1
3
)
=
arccot
(
2
√
2
)
= arccsc(3) = arcsin
(
1
3
)
. For symmetry rea-
sons, the same estimate holds for planar configurations be-
tween b and b′. For non-planar configurations the angles must
be even less than for planar ones.
True-implies-true properties have also been studied by
Stairs [39, p. 588-589, note added in proof]; Clifton [40, 43,
44, Sects. II,III, Fig. 1] presents a similar argument, based
5upon another true-implies-true logic inspired by Bell [38,
Fig. C.l. p. 67] (cf. also Pitowsky [52, p. 394]), on the Specker
bug logic [40, Sects. IV, Fig. 2]. More recently Hardy [53–55]
as well as Cabello and Garcı´a-Alcaine and others [32, 56–60]
have discussed such scenarios.
Another true-implies-true configuration depicted in
Fig. 5(b) has an immediate quantum realization [51, Table. 1,
p. 102201-7] for |〈a|b〉|2 = 1
2
, and can be extended to
arbitrary angles between non-collinear and non-orthogonal
vectors.
A combo of Specker bug logics renders a non-separable
set of two-valued states [34, Γ3, p. 70]: in the logic de-
picted in Fig. 4(c), a and a′ as well as b and b′ can-
not be “separated” from one another by any non-contextual
(quasi)classical truth assignment enumerated in Appendix D.
Kochen and Specker [34, Theorem 0, p. 67] pointed out that
this type of inseparability is a necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for a logic to be not embeddable in any classical Boolean
algebra. Therefore, whereas both the Specker bug logic as
well as its extension true-implies-true logic can be represented
by a partition logic, the combo Specker bug logic cannot.
E. Logics inducing partial value (in)definiteness
Probably the strongest forms on value indefiniteness [61,
62] are theorems [51, 63, 64] stating that relative to reasonable
(admissibility, non-contextuality) assumptions, if a quantized
system is prepared in some pure state |a〉, then any observ-
able which is not identical or orthogonal to |a〉 is undefined.
That is, there exist finite systems of quantum contexts whose
pasting are demanding that any pure state |b〉 not belonging
to some context with |a〉 can neither be true nor false; else a
complete contradiction would follow from the assumption of
classically pre-existent truth values on some pasting of con-
texts such as the Specker bug logic.
What does “strong” mean here? Suppose one prepares the
system in a particular contextC such that a single vector |a〉 ∈
C is true; that is, |a〉 has probabilitymeasure 1 whenmeasured
along C . Then, if one measures a complementary variable
|b〉, and |b〉 is sufficiently separated from |a〉 (more precisely,
at least an angle arccos
(
1
3
)
apart for the Specker bug logic),
then intertwined quantum propositional structures (such as the
Specker bug logic) exist which, interpreted (quasi)classically,
demand that |b〉 can never occur (cannot be true) – and yet
quantum system allow |b〉 to occur. Likewise, other inter-
twined contexts which correspond to true-implies-true config-
urations of quantum observables (termed Hardy-like [53–55]
by Cabello [60]) (quasi)classically imply that some endpoint
|b′〉 must always occur, given |a〉 is true. And yet, quantum
mechanically, since |a〉 and |b′〉 are not collinear, quantum
mechanics predicts that occasionally |b′〉 does not occur. In
the “strongest” form [51, 63, 64] of classical “do’s and don’ts”
there are no possibilities whatsoever for an observable propo-
sition to be either true or false. That is, even if the Specker bug
simultaneously allows some |a〉 to be true and |b〉 to be false
(although disallowing the latter to be true), there is another,
supposedly more sophisticated finite configuration of inter-
a
10
9
8
7
6
b
5
4
3
2
1
11
(a)
a
10
9
8
7
6
b
5 4
3
21
11
a′
b′
c
(b)
a
10
9
8
7
6
b
5 4
3
21
11
a′
10’9’
8’
7’ 6’
b′
5’
4’
3’
2’
1’
11’
c
(c)
FIG. 4. Greechie orthogonality diagram of (a) the Specker bug
logic [33, Fig. 1, p. 182]. A proof that, if the system is prepared
in state a, then classical (non-contextual) truth assignments require
b not to occur, proceeds as follows: In such a truth assignment, as
per axiom A3, there is only one true atom per context; all the others
have to be false. In a proof by contradiction, suppose that both a and
b are true. Then all atoms connected to them (2,4,7,9) must be false.
This in turn requires that the observables (3,8) connecting them must
both be true. Alas, those two observables (3,8) are connected by a
“middle” context {3,11,8}. But the occurrence of two true observ-
ables within the same context is forbidden by axiom A3. The only
consistent alternative is to disallow b to be true if a is assumed to be
true; or, conversely, to disallow a to be true if b is assumed to be true.
(b) Greechie orthogonality diagram of a Specker bug logic extended
by two contexts which has the true-implies-true property on a′, given
a to be true [34, Γ1, p. 68]. (c) Greechie orthogonality diagram of a
combo of two Specker bug logics [34, Γ3, p. 70]. If a is assumed to
be true then the remaining atoms in the context {a,c,b′} connecting
a with b′, and, in particular, c, have to be false. Also if a is true then
b is false. Therefore, a′ needs to be true if b and c both are false, be-
cause they form the context {b,c,a′}. This argument is valid even in
the absence of a second Specker bug logic. Introduction of a second
Specker bug logic ensures the converse: whenever a′ is true, a must
be true as well. Therefore a and a′ (and by symmetry also b and b′)
cannot be separated by any truth assignment.
6twined quantum contexts, which can be constructively enu-
merated and which disallows |b〉 even to be false (it cannot be
true either).
For the sake of an explicit example take the logic [51, Fig. 2,
p. 102201-8] depicted in Fig. 5(c). It is the composite of two
logics depicted in Figs. 5(a),(b), which perform very differ-
ently at b given a to be true: whereas (a) implements a true-
implies-false property, (b) has a true-implies-true property for
the atoms a and b, respectively. Both (a) and (b) are proper
subsets (lacking 2 contexts) of the logic in Fig. 5(c); and, apart
from their difference in 4 contexts, are identical.
More precisely, as explicated in Appendix E, both of these
logics (a) and (b) allow 13 truth assignments (two-valued
states), but only a single one allows a to be true on either
of them. (This uniqueness is not essential to the argument.)
The logic in (c) allows for 8 truth assignments, but all of them
assign falsity to a. By combining the logics (a) and (b) one ob-
tains (c) which, if a is assumed to be true, implies that b can
neither be true – this would contradict the true-implies-false
property of (a) – nor can it be false – because this would con-
tradict the true-implies-true property of (b). Hence we are left
with the only consistent alternative, (relative to the assump-
tions): that a system prepared in state a must be value indef-
inite for observable b. Thereby, as the truth assignment on b
is not defined, it must be partial on the entire logic depicted in
Fig. 5(c).
The scheme of the proof is as follows:
(i) Find a logic (collection of intertwined contexts of ob-
servables) exhibiting a true-implies-false property on
the two atoms a and b.
(ii) Find another logic exhibiting a true-implies-true prop-
erty on the same two atoms a and b.
(iii) Then join (paste) these logics into a larger logic, which,
given a, neither allows b to be true nor false. Conse-
quently b must be value indefinite.
The most suggestive candidate for such a pasting is, however,
unavailable: it is the combination of a Specker bug logic and
another, extended Specker bug logic, as depicted in Fig. 6.
Such logic cannot be realized in three dimensions, as the an-
gles cannot be chosen consistently; that is, obeying the Ca-
bello bounds on the relative angles, respectively.
The latter result about the partiality of the truth assignment
has already been discussed by Pitowsky [61], and later by
Hrushovski and Pitowsky [62]. It should also be mentioned
that the logic (c) has been realized with a particular configu-
ration in three-dimensional real Hilbert space [51, Tables I,II,
p. 102201-7]which are an angle∠(a,b) = arccos
(
1√
2
)
apart,
but, as has been mentioned earlier, this kind of value indefi-
niteness on any particular state b, given that the system has
been prepared in state a, can be constructively obtained by
an extension of the above configuration whenever a and b are
neither collinear (in this case b would be true) nor orthogo-
nal (in this case b would be false). So basically all states not
identical (or orthogonal) to the state prepared must be value
indefinite.
b
a
(a)
b
a
(b)
b 2 3
21
23
29
5a4
10
7
6
1
11
9
8
28
22
19
24
25
35
34
27
26
12
13
31
30
15
14
17
16
18 32
33 20
(c)
FIG. 5. Greechie orthogonality diagram of a logic [51, Fig. 2,
p. 102201-8] realizable in R3 (a) with the true–implies–false prop-
erty; (b) with the true–implies–true property; (c) with the true–
implies–value indefiniteness (neither true nor false) property on the
atoms a and b, respectively. (a) and (b) contain the single (out of 13)
value assignment which is possible, and for which a is true. All 8
value assignments of the logic depicted in (c) require a to be false.
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b
c
FIG. 6. Greechie orthogonality diagram of a logic which is value
indefinite on b (as well as on c for symmetry reasons), given a is
true; alas such a logic has no realization in three dimensional Hilbert
space, as the angles ∠(a,b) between a and b should simultaneously
obey 1.2≈ arcsec(3)≤ ∠(a,b)≤ arccsc(3)≈ 0.3.
All three logics in Fig. 6(a)-(c) have another non-classical
feature: they are non-unital [49], meaning that the truth as-
signments on some of their atoms can only acquire the value
false, regardless of the preparation. That is, in this “state-
independend” form, whenever a proposition corresponding to
such an atom is measured to be true, this can be interpreted as
indication of non-classicality. (Note that one can always ro-
tate the entire set of rays so that this particular atom coincides
with some observable measured.)
V. PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC DOES NOT UNIQUELY
DETERMINE PROBABILITIES
By now it should be clear that the propositional structure
does in general not uniquely determine its probabilities. The
Specker bug in Fig. 4(a) serves as a good example for that: it
supports (quasi)classical probabilities, explicitly enumerated
in Refs. [9, p. 286, Fig. 11.5(iii)] and [10, p. 91, Fig. 12.10]
which are formed by convex combinations of all two-valued
states on them.
Other propositional structures such as the pentagon logic
support “exotic” probability measures [26] which do not van-
ish at their interlink observables and are equally weighted
with value 1
2
there. This measure is neither realized in the
(quasi)classical partition logic setup explicitly discussed in
Refs. [9, p. 289, Fig. 11.8] and [10, p. 88, Fig. 12.8], nor in
quantum mechanics. It remains to be seen if a more general
theory of probability measures based on the axioms A1-A3
can be found.
VI. SOME PLATONIST AFTERTHOUGHTS
The author’s not-so-humble reading of all these aforemen-
tioned “mind-boggling” non-classical quantum predictions is
a rather sober one: in view of the numerous indications that
classical value definiteness cannot be extended to more than a
single context, the most plausible supposition is that, besides
exotic possibilities [65, 66], ontologically there is only one
such “Realding” – indeed a rather obvious candidate suggest-
ing itself as ontology: a single vector, or rather a single con-
text. Quantized systems can be completely and exhaustively
characterized by a unique context, and a “true” proposition
within this context.
Suppose for a moment that this hypothesis is correct, and
that there is no ontology, no “Realding,” beyond a single con-
text. There is one preferred view – namely the context iden-
tical to the context in which the system has been prepared –
and all but one epistemic views.
And yet, a confusing experience is the apparent ease by
which an experimenter appears to measure, without any diffi-
culty, a context or (maximal) observable not (or only partly
through intertwines) matching the preparation context. In
such a situation one may assume that the measurement grants
an “imperfect” view on the preparation context. In this pro-
cess, information – in particular, the relative locatedness of
the measurement context with respect to the preparation con-
text – is augmented by properties of the measurement device,
thereby effectively generating entanglement [67, 68] via con-
text translation [69]. Frames of reference which do not co-
incide with the “Realding” or preparation context necessar-
ily include stochastic elements which are not caused or deter-
mined by any property of the formerly individual “Realding.”
One may conclude [70] with Bohr’s 1972 Como lecture [71,
p. 580] that “any observation of atomic phenomena will in-
volve an interaction with the agency of observation not to be
neglected. Accordingly, an independent reality in the ordi-
nary physical sense can neither be ascribed to the phenom-
ena nor to the agencies of observation.” That is, any inter-
action between the previously separated individual object and
the measurement device results in a joint physical state which
is no longer determined by the states of the (previously) indi-
vidual constituents [68, 72]. Instead, the joint state exhibits
what Schro¨dinger later called entanglement [67]. Entangle-
ment characterized by a value definite relational [73] or col-
lective (re-)encoding of information with respect to the con-
stituent parts, thereby (since the unitary quantum evolution is
injective) resulting in a value indefiniteness of the previously
individual and separate parts. As a result, knowledge about
observations obtained by different contexts than the prepa-
ration context are necessarily (at least partially in the sense
of the augmented information from the measurement device)
epistemic.
Another possible source of perplexity might be the various
types of algabaic or logical structures involved. Classically,
empirical logics are Boolean algebras. Then, in a first step to-
wards non-classicality, there are partition logics which are not
Boolean any longer (they feature complementarity through
non-distributivity) but nevertheless still allow for a certain
8type of (quasi)classicality; that is, a separating and unital set
of two-valued states. And then, further on this road, there are
(finite) quantum logics which do not allow any definite state
at all.
One might be puzzled by the fact that there exist “interme-
diate” logics, such as the Specker bug or the pentagon (pen-
tagram) logic discussed in Sects. IVC and IVB, which still
allow (even classical) simultaneous value indefiniteness, al-
though they contain observables which are mutually comple-
mentary (non-collinear and non-orthogonal). However, this
apparent paradox should rather be interpreted epistemically,
as means (configuration) relative [74]: in the case of the pen-
tagon we have decided to concentrate on 10 observables in a
cyclic pasting of 5 contexts, but we have thereby implicitly
chosen to “look the other way” and disregard the abundance
of other observables which impose much more stringent con-
ditions on the value definiteness of the observables in the pen-
tagon logic than the pentagon logic itself.
So, properties such as the true-implies-false, the true-
implies-true properties, as well as inseparability and even
value indefiniteness, are means relative and valid only if one
restricts or broadens one’s attention to sometimes very spe-
cific, limited sublogics of the realm of all conceivable quan-
tum logics, which are structures formed by perpendicular pro-
jection operators in Hilbert spaces of dimension larger than
two.
Pointedly stated, sets of intertwining contexts connecting
two (or more) relevant complementary observables a and b
should be considered as totally arbitrary when it comes to
the inclusion or exclusion of particular contexts intercon-
necting them: there is neither a necessity nor even a com-
pelling reason to take into account one such structue and dis-
regard another, or favour one over the other. Indeed, in an
extreme, sui generis, form of the argument, suppose a sin-
gle quantum is prepared in some state a. Then every sin-
gle outcome of a measurement of every complementary (non-
collinear and non-orthogonal relative to the state prepared)
quantum observable may be considered as “proof” or “certifi-
cation of non-classicality” (or, in another terminology, “con-
textuality”). Because those observable can be identified with
the “endpoint” b of either some true-implies-false, or alter-
natively true-implies-true configuration [say the one sketched
in Figs. 6(a),(b)], depending on whether the classical false or
true predictions need to contradict the particular outcome, re-
spectively. For quantum logics with a unital set of two-valued
states – such as the logics depicted by Tkadlec [49, p. 207,
Fig. 2] or the ones in Figs. 6(a),(b) – one could even get rid
of the state preparation if b occurs and is identified with an
observable which, according to the classical predictions as-
sociated with that logic, cannot occur. There is no principle
which could prevent us from arguing that way if we insist on
the simultaneous existence of multiple contexts encountered
in quantum mechanics. Indeed, are intertwining contexts not
scholastic [75] sophisms in desperate need of deconstruction?
An interesting historical question arises: Kochen and
Specker, in a succession of papers on partial algebras [33, 34,
76] have insisted that logical operations should only be de-
fined within contexts and must not be applied to propositions
outside of it. And yet they have considered extended counter-
factual structures of pasted context, ending up in a holistic ar-
gument involving complementary observables. Of course, an
immediate reply might be that without intertwined contexts
there cannot be any non-trivial (non-classical, non-Boolean)
configuration of observables which is of any interest.
For the reasons mentioned earlier, the emphasis should not
be on “completing” quantum mechanics by some sort of hid-
den parameter theory – such as, for instance, Valentini [77]
envisioning a theory which is to quantum mechanics as sta-
tistical physics is to thermodynamics – but just the opposite:
the challenge is to acknowledge the scarcity of resources – the
“Realding” or physical state as mere vector – despite the con-
tinuum of possible views on it, resulting in an illusory over-
abundance and over-determination.
In this line of thought the question of what might be the
reason behind the futility to co-define non-commuting quan-
tum observables (from two or more different contexts) simul-
taneously should be answered in terms of a serious lack of a
proper perspective of what one is dealing with: Metaphori-
cally speaking, it is almost as if one pretends to take a 360◦
panorama of what lies in the outside world while actually
merely takes photos from some sort of echo chamber, or house
of mirrors – partly reflecting what is in it, and partly repro-
ducing the observer (photographer) in almost endless reflec-
tions. Stitching together photos from these reflections yields a
panorama of one and the same object in seemingly endless va-
rieties. In this way one might end up with a horribly distorted
image of this situation; and with the inside turned outside.
This is not dissimilar to what Plato outlined in the Repub-
lic’s cave metaphor [78, Book 7, 515c, p. 221]: “what people
in this situation would take for truth would be nothing more
than the shadows of the manufactured objects.” In the quan-
tum transcription of this metaphor, the vectors are the objects,
and the shadows taken for truth are the views on these objects,
mediated or translated [69] by arbitrarymismatching contexts.
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9Appendix A: Two-valued states, (quasi)classical probabilities on
the triangular logic in 4 dimensions
The two-valued states (aka truth tables) have been enumer-
ated by Josef Tkadlec’s Pascal program 2states [79]. Im-
plicitly, the convex sums over the respective probabilities en-
code the truth tables, as, on any particular atom, the i’th truth
table entry is 1 if λi appears in the listing of the classical prob-
ability pi. Otherwise, the i’th truth table entry is zero.
The bounds for classical probabilities have been obtained
by Komei Fukuda’s cddlib package [25].
There are 9 propositions forming three contexts {1,2,3,4},
{4,5,6,7}, and {7,8,9,1} allowing 14 (separating, unital)
two-valued states whose convex sum yield the following
(quasi)classical probabilities:
p1 =λ1+λ2,
p2 =λ3+λ4+λ5+λ6+λ7,
p3 =λ8+λ9+λ10+λ11+λ12,
p4 =λ13+λ14,
p5 =λ1+λ3+λ4+λ8+λ9,
p6 =λ2+λ5+λ6+λ10+λ11,
p7 =λ7+λ12,
p8 =λ3+λ5+λ8+λ10+λ13,
p9 =λ4+λ6+λ9+λ11+λ14.
(A1)
Appendix B: Truth assignments, (quasi)classical probabilities
on the square logic in 4 dimensions
There are 12 propositions forming four contexts {1,2,3,4},
{4,5,6,7}, {7,8,9,10}, and {10,11,12,1} allowing 34 (sep-
arating, unital) two-valued states whose convex sum yield the
following (quasi)classical probabilities:
p1 =λ1+λ2+λ3+λ4+λ5,
p2 =λ6+λ7+λ8+λ9+λ10+λ11
+λ12+λ13+λ14+λ15+λ16+λ17,
p3 =λ18+λ19+λ20+λ21+λ22+λ23
+λ24+λ25+λ26+λ24+λ28+λ29,
p4 =λ30+λ31+λ32+λ33+λ34,
p5 =λ1+λ2+λ6+λ7+λ8+λ9
+λ10+λ18+λ19+λ20+λ21+λ22,
p6 =λ3+λ4+λ11+λ12+λ13+λ14
+λ15+λ23+λ24+λ25+λ26+λ27,
p7 =λ5+λ16+λ17+λ28+λ29,
p8 =λ1+λ3+λ6+λ7+λ11+λ12
+λ18+λ19+λ23+λ24+λ30+λ31,
p9 =λ2+λ4+λ8+λ9+λ13+λ14
+λ20+λ21+λ25+λ26+λ32+λ33,
p10 =λ10+λ15+λ22+λ27+λ34,
p11 =λ6+λ8+λ11+λ13+λ16+λ18
+λ20+λ23+λ25+λ28+λ30+λ32,
p12 =λ7+λ9+λ12+λ14+λ17+λ19
+λ21+λ24+λ26+λ29+λ31+λ33.
(B1)
Appendix C: Two-valued states, (quasi)classical probabilities on
the pentagon (pentagram) logic in 3 dimensions
There are 5 contexts {1,2,3}, {3,4,5}, {5,6,7},
{7,8,9}, and {9,10,1} allowing 11 (separating, unital) two-
valued states [26] whose convex sum yield the following
(quasi)classical probabilities:
p1 =λ1+λ2+λ3,
p2 =λ4+λ5+λ7+λ9+λ11,
p3 =λ6+λ8+λ10,
p4 =λ1+λ2+λ4+λ7+λ11,
p5 =λ3+λ5+λ9,
p6 =λ1+λ4+λ6+λ10+λ11,
p7 =λ2+λ7+λ8,
p8 =λ1+λ3+λ9+λ10+λ11,
p9 =λ4+λ5+λ6,
p10 =λ7+λ8+λ9+λ10+λ11.
(C1)
Appendix D: Truth assignments, (quasi)classical probabilities
on the Specker bug combo logic
The logic depicted in Fig. 4(c) contains 27 propositions
forming 16 contexts {a,1,2}, {2,3,4}, {4,5,b}, {b,6,7},
{7,8,9}, {9,10,a}, {3,8,11}, {a,c,b′}, {b,c,a′}, {a′,1′,2′},
{2′,3′,4′}, {4′,5′,b′}, {b′,6′,7′}, {7′,8′,9′}, {9′,10′,a′}, and
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{3′,8′,11′}, allowing 82 non-separating on a/a′ and b/b′, uni-
tal two-valued states (not enumerated here because of vol-
ume). 9 and 9 of these permit a as well as a′, and b as well as
b′ to be true, respectively.
The logic depicted in Fig. 4(b) contains 16 propositions
forming 9 contexts {a,1,2}, {2,3,4}, {4,5,b}, {b,6,7},
{7,8,9}, {9,10,a}, {3,8,11}, {a,c,b′}, {b,c,a′}, allowing
22 (separating and unital) two-valued states which, through
their convex summation, yield the (quasi-)classical probabili-
ties:
pa =λ1+λ2+λ3,
pb =λ8+λ21+λ22,
pa′ =λ1+λ2+λ3+λ5+λ7+λ10
+λ12+λ14+λ16+λ18+λ20,
pb′ =λ5+λ7+λ8+λ10+λ12+λ14
+λ16+λ18+λ20+λ21+λ22,
pc =λ4+λ6+λ9+λ11+λ13+λ15+λ17+λ19,
p1 =λ4+λ5+λ6+λ7+λ8+λ9
+λ10+λ11+λ12+λ13+λ14,
p2 =λ15+λ16+λ17+λ18+λ19+λ20+λ21+λ22,
p3 =λ1+λ4+λ5+λ6+λ7+λ8,
p4 =λ2+λ3+λ9+λ10+λ11+λ12+λ13+λ14,
p5 =λ1+λ4+λ5+λ6+λ7+λ15
+λ16+λ17+λ18+λ19+λ20,
p6 =λ2+λ4+λ5+λ9+λ10+λ11
+λ12+λ15+λ16+λ17+λ18,
p7 =λ1+λ3+λ6+λ7+λ13+λ14+λ19+λ20,
p8 =λ2+λ9+λ10+λ15+λ16+λ21,
p9 =λ4+λ5+λ8+λ11+λ12+λ17+λ18+λ22,
p10 =λ6+λ7+λ9+λ10+λ13+λ14
+λ15+λ16+λ19+λ20+λ21,
p11 =λ3+λ11+λ12+λ13+λ14+λ17
+λ18+λ19+λ20+λ22.
(D1)
Note that, for all configurations, pa = λ1+λ2+λ3 ≤ pa′ , im-
plying that, whenever a is true a′ must be true as well.
The Specker bug logic depicted in Fig. 4(a) contains 13
propositions forming 7 contexts {a,1,2}, {2,3,4}, {4,5,b},
{b,6,7}, {7,8,9}, {9,10,a}, {3,8,11}, allowing 14 (separat-
ing and unital) two-valued states:
pa =λ1+λ2+λ3,
pb =λ6+λ13+λ14,
p1 =λ4+λ5+λ6+λ7+λ8+λ9,
p2 =λ10+λ11+λ12+λ13+λ14,
p3 =λ1+λ4+λ5+λ6,
p4 =λ2+λ3+λ7+λ8+λ9,
p5 =λ1+λ4+λ5+λ10+λ11+λ12,
p6 =λ2+λ4+λ7+λ8+λ10+λ11,
p7 =λ1+λ3+λ5+λ9+λ12,
p8 =λ2+λ7+λ10+λ13,
p9 =λ4+λ6+λ8+λ11+λ14,
p10 =λ5+λ7+λ9+λ10+λ12+λ13,
p11 =λ3+λ8+λ9+λ11+λ12+λ14.
(D2)
Note that, for all configurations, whenever a is true b is false,
and vice versa.
Appendix E: Truth assignments, (quasi)classical probabilities
on truth-implies-value indefiniteness logic in 3 dimensions
Fig. 6(c) depicts 37 propositions {a,b,1,2,3, . . . ,35}
in 26 contexts {a,1,2}, {b,2,3}, {4,a,5}, {b,6,7},
[{7,10,4}](a),(c), [{10,12,13}](a),(c), [{5,29,23}](b),(c),
[{13,31,29}](b),(c), {3,21,23}, {4,28,22}, {22,19,3},
{b,8,9}, {9,11,5}, {28,30,15}, {15,14,11}, {6,33,17},
{17,20,21}, {7,34,27}, {27,26,23}, {22,24,25},
{25,35,9}, {15,17,1}, {13,16,1}, {16,18,19}, {16,32,8},
{25,1,27}, allowing 8 (non-separating, non-unital on a, 2,
13, 15, 16, 17, 25, 27) two-valued states whose convex sum
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yield the following weights:
pa =p2 = p13 = p15 = p16 = p17 = p25 = p27 = 0,
pb =λ1+λ2+λ3+λ4,
p1 =λ1+λ2+λ3+λ4+λ5+λ6+λ7+λ8 = 1,
p3 =+λ5+λ6+λ7+λ8,
p4 =λ1+λ2+λ5+λ6,
p5 =λ3+λ4+λ7+λ8,
p6 =λ5+λ6+λ7,
p7 =λ8, p9 = λ6, p22 = λ4, p23 = λ2,
p8 =λ5+λ7+λ8,
p10 =λ3+λ4+λ7,
p11 =λ1+λ2+λ5,
p12 =λ1+λ2+λ5+λ6+λ8,
p14 =λ3+λ4+λ6+λ7+λ8,
p18 =λ4+λ5+λ6+λ7+λ8,
p19 =λ1+λ2+λ3,
p20 =+λ2+λ5+λ6+λ7+λ8,
p21 =λ1+λ3+λ4,
p24 =λ1+λ2+λ3+λ5+λ6+λ7+λ8,
p26 =λ1+λ3+λ4+λ5+λ6+λ7+λ8,
p28 =λ3+λ7+λ8,
p29 =λ1+λ5+λ6,
p30 =λ1+λ2+λ4+λ5+λ6,
p31 =λ2+λ3+λ4+λ7+λ8,
p32 =λ1+λ2+λ3+λ4+λ6,
p33 =λ1+λ2+λ3+λ4+λ8,
p34 =λ1+λ2+λ3+λ4+λ5+λ6+λ7,
p35 =λ1+λ2+λ3+λ4+λ5+λ7+λ8.
(E1)
The logics in Figs. 6(a) and 6(b) contain 35 observables in
24 contexts which are the same as before in Fig. 6(c) lacking
two contexts [{5,29,23}](b),(c) and [{13,31,29}](b),(c), as well
as [{7,10,4}](a),(c) and [{10,12,13}](a),(c), respectively.
The logic in Figs. 6(a) allows 13 (non-unital on 16) two-
valued states whose convex sum yield the following weights:
pa =λ1,
pb =λ2+λ3+λ4+λ5+λ6+λ7,
p16 =0,
p1 =λ2+λ3+λ4+λ5+λ6+λ7+λ8+λ9+λ10+λ11,
p2 =λ12+λ13,
p3 =λ1+λ8+λ9+λ10+λ11,
p4 =λ2+λ3+λ8+λ9+λ12,
p5 =λ4+λ5+λ6+λ7+λ10+λ11+λ13,
p6 =λ8+λ9+λ10+λ12,
p7 =λ1+λ11+λ13,
p8 =λ1+λ8+λ10+λ11+λ13,
p9 =λ9+λ12,
p10 =λ4+λ5+λ6+λ7+λ10,
p11 =λ1+λ2+λ3+λ8,
p12 =λ2+λ3+λ8+λ9+λ11,
p13 =λ1+λ12+λ13,
p14 =λ4+λ5+λ6+λ7+λ9+λ10+λ11+λ13,
p15 =λ12,
p17 =λ1+λ13,
p18 =λ1+λ5+λ7+λ8+λ9+λ10+λ11,
p19 =λ2+λ3+λ4+λ6+λ12+λ13,
p20 =λ3+λ6+λ7+λ8+λ9+λ10+λ11,
p21 =λ2+λ4+λ5+λ12,
p22 =λ5+λ7,
p23 =λ3+λ6+λ7+λ13,
p24 =λ2+λ3+λ4+λ6+λ8+λ9+λ10+λ11+λ12,
p25 =λ1+λ13,
p26 =λ1+λ2+λ4+λ5+λ8+λ9+λ10+λ11,
p27 =λ12,
p28 =λ1+λ4+λ6+λ10+λ11+λ13,
p30 =λ2+λ3+λ5+λ7+λ8+λ9,
p32 =λ2+λ3+λ4+λ5+λ6+λ7+λ9+λ12,
p33 =λ2+λ3+λ4+λ5+λ6+λ7+λ11,
p34 =λ2+λ3+λ4+λ5+λ6+λ7+λ8+λ9+λ10,
p35 =λ2+λ3+λ4+λ5+λ6+λ7+λ8+λ10+λ11.
(E2)
Therefore, whenever a is true, that is, pa = λ1 = 1, b has to be
false, because pb = λ2+λ3+λ4+λ5+λ6+λ7 = 0.
Conversely, the logic in Figs. 6(b) allows 13 (non-
separating on 15/27 and non-unital on 16) two-valued states
12
whose convex sum yield the following weights:
pa =λ1,
pb =λ1+λ2+λ3+λ4+λ5,
p16 =0,
p1 =λ2+λ3+λ4+λ5+λ6+λ7+λ8+λ9+λ10+λ11,
p2 =λ12+λ13,
p3 =λ6+λ7+λ8+λ9+λ10+λ11,
p4 =λ2+λ3+λ6+λ7+λ8+λ9+λ12,
p5 =λ4+λ5+λ10+λ11+λ13,
p6 =λ6+λ7+λ10+λ13,
p7 =λ8+λ9+λ11+λ12,
p8 =λ6+λ8+λ10+λ11+λ12+λ13,
p9 =λ7+λ9,
p11 =λ1+λ2+λ3+λ6+λ8+λ12,
p13 =λ1+λ12+λ13,
p14 =λ4+λ5+λ7+λ9+λ10+λ11,
p15 =p27 = λ13,
p17 =λ1+λ12,
p18 =λ5+λ6+λ7+λ8+λ9+λ10+λ11+λ13,
p19 =λ1+λ2+λ3+λ4+λ12,
p20 =λ3+λ6+λ7+λ8+λ9+λ10+λ11,
p21 =λ2+λ4+λ5+λ13,
p22 =λ5+λ13,
p23 =λ1+λ3+λ12,
p24 =λ2+λ3+λ4+λ6+λ7+λ8+λ9+λ10+λ11,
p25 =λ1+λ12,
p26 =λ2+λ4+λ5+λ6+λ7+λ8+λ9+λ10+λ11,
p28 =λ1+λ4+λ10+λ11,
p29 =λ2+λ6+λ7+λ8+λ9,
p30 =λ2+λ3+λ5+λ6+λ7+λ8+λ9+λ12,
p31 =λ3+λ4+λ5+λ10+λ11,
p32 =λ1+λ2+λ3+λ4+λ5+λ7+λ9,
p33 =λ2+λ3+λ4+λ5+λ8+λ9+λ11,
p34 =λ1+λ2+λ3+λ4+λ5+λ6+λ7+λ10,
p35 =λ2+λ3+λ4+λ5+λ6+λ8+λ10+λ11+λ13.
(E3)
Therefore, whenever a is true, that is, pa = λ1 = 1, b has to be
true, because pb = λ1+λ2+λ3+λ4+λ5 = λ1 = 1.
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